I spent over a decade working in Government commercials. From outsourcing deals to NHS PFI. I was even a member of the DWP commercial board for a few years. There is one part of Government commercials which puzzles me:
The Government insists that Britain exports very little military equipment to Israel. At the same time, ministers have repeatedly argued that they cannot simply stop all defence exports to Israel. On the face of it, those two statements appear contradictory. If the trade is so small, why not end it? And if the trade with Israel is so small and low key why were people found guilty of terrorism for disrupting it.
The answer lies in the way modern defence industries work. Britain does not simply sell tanks or fighter aircraft to Israel, nor does Israel simply sell military equipment back to Britain. Instead, both countries are part of a highly integrated international defence industry built around global supply chains, specialist technologies and multinational manufacturing programmes. Understanding that relationship requires looking beyond the headlines.
Israel is a tiny customer for Britain’s defence industry
The UK defence industry is a significant exporter in its own right. In 2024 British companies secured around £13.2 billion in defence export orders, making the UK one of the world’s leading defence exporters. Aerospace accounts for more than half of those exports, with customers ranging from NATO allies to countries across the Middle East and Asia.
Against that backdrop, Israel is a remarkably small customer. The Middle East is an important market for British defence companies, but it is dominated by countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman. Israel represents well under one per cent of UK defence exports.
The picture looks similar from Israel’s perspective. Israel imports sophisticated military equipment from a number of countries, but overwhelmingly from the United States. Germany is its second largest supplier. Together those two countries account for virtually all of Israel’s imports of major conventional weapons. Britain supplies only a tiny proportion by value, less than one per cent.
In purely economic terms, therefore, Britain is not a significant supplier of military equipment to Israel. The political controversy arises because of what Britain supplies rather than how much it supplies.
What does Britain actually export?
Much of the public debate creates the impression that Britain exports complete weapons systems to Israel. In reality, the licences issued by the Government paint a rather different picture.
Export licences cover items such as:
- aircraft and aircraft components;
- parts for military helicopters;
- drone and unmanned aircraft components;
- electro-optical targeting equipment;
- military communications systems;
- electronic components;
- armoured vehicle parts;
- protective equipment such as helmets and body armour;
- and a range of dual-use technologies with both civilian and military applications.
| Category | Typical goods still licensed | Status |
|---|---|---|
| F-35 Global Programme | Aircraft components entering the multinational F-35 supply chain (not exported directly for Israeli military use) | Permitted |
| Aircraft components | Parts for trainer aircraft, transport aircraft and some aviation systems not covered by the suspension | Permitted (case by case) |
| Naval equipment | Components for naval platforms and maritime systems not assessed as contributing to Gaza operations | Permitted |
| Communications equipment | Secure communications systems and military electronics | Permitted where licensing criteria met |
| Telecommunications & data equipment | Civilian and dual-use communications infrastructure | Permitted |
| Imaging equipment | Industrial and scientific imaging systems for civilian applications | Permitted |
| Industrial software | Manufacturing and engineering software | Permitted |
| Laboratory chemicals | Chemicals for research and industrial testing | Permitted |
| Protective equipment | Helmets, body armour and other protective items | Permitted |
| Re-export components | Components incorporated into products exported from Israel to third countries | Permitted |
| Non-government end users | Universities, research organisations, commercial firms and NGOs | Permitted where criteria met |
Many licences relate to components rather than complete systems. A British-made electronic module or optical sensor may become one small part of a much larger aircraft or weapons system assembled elsewhere.
The export licensing system authorises companies to export specified categories of equipment. A licence is permission to export, not evidence that the full value of goods has actually been shipped.
The suspension of export licences
Following the conflict in Gaza, the Government reviewed every export licence relating to Israel.
In September 2024 ministers announced that around thirty licences would be suspended after concluding that there was a clear risk that certain equipment might be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law.
| Suspended category | Reason |
|---|---|
| Components for combat aircraft (including F-16 related items) | Risk of use in Gaza operations |
| UAV (drone) components | Risk of military use |
| Military radar and targeting equipment | Risk of military use |
| Naval systems linked to combat operations | Risk of military use |
| Other military equipment assessed as capable of contributing directly to operations in Gaza | Suspended following legal review |
The suspension covered a range of military equipment and components, particularly where there was a direct risk of use by the Israeli armed forces.
However, around two hundred licences remained in force.
This was not because the Government believed every remaining licence was uncontroversial. Instead, it concluded that many fell into categories where suspension would have wider consequences.
Some licences relate to exports destined for non-government users, including research organisations and humanitarian bodies rather than the Israeli Government or armed forces. Others relate to multinational defence programmes where Britain is one contributor among many.
The result was a partial suspension rather than a complete embargo.
Why not simply stop everything?
This is where the debate becomes considerably more complicated.
Some of the equipment we sell to Israel doesn’t go to the Israeli military, it goes to NGOs working as human rights monitors in Gaza and the West Bank. We wouldn’t want to stop those supplies.
But a much bigger factor is how modern defence industries are organised around international supply chains rather than national factories producing complete weapons.
The best example is the F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft.
Britain manufactures a significant number of components used in every F-35 produced worldwide. Those aircraft are assembled through an international programme involving the United States and numerous partner countries before eventually being supplied to several air forces, including Israel’s.
The Government has argued that blocking British-made components from entering the global F-35 supply chain would not simply affect Israel. It could disrupt an international programme on which Britain itself depends and undermine commitments to defence partners.
That is why components entering the wider F-35 programme continued to be licensed even after many other licences were suspended. The future for NATO and defence alliances in the age of Trump means the UK taking part in joint defence procurement and capacity building with like minded nations. That means UK parts going into global supply chains, which might end up with 3rd parties like Israel.
Whether that judgement was correct is a matter of political debate. What is clear is that the issue is far more complicated than simply refusing to export complete aircraft directly to Israel.
The other side of the relationship: what Britain buys from Israel
But there is another massive reason why we can’t end defence sales. Britain also purchases defence technology developed by Israeli companies.
Obtaining detailed information about these imports is considerably more difficult than analysing exports because Britain publishes comprehensive export licence data but far less information about defence procurement from overseas suppliers.
Nevertheless, the broad picture is clear. We are a buyer as well as a seller.
Israeli companies have become world leaders in several specialist technologies, including:
- surveillance systems;
- electro-optical sensors;
- battlefield imaging equipment;
- electronic warfare;
- drone technology;
- secure military communications;
- intelligence software;
- and cyber security.
Many of these technologies are not traditional “arms” in the sense that most people understand the term. A thermal imaging system, surveillance sensor or artificial intelligence platform may never fire a shot, yet it can be just as important to modern military operations as a missile or tank.
This is particularly true in cyber warfare and battlefield surveillance.
Israel has spent decades developing expertise in intelligence gathering, unmanned systems and electronic warfare. Those capabilities are recognised internationally, and British defence programmes have drawn upon Israeli-developed technology in a number of areas.
The distinction between military and civilian technology is also becoming increasingly blurred. Software developed for military intelligence may also have applications in protecting critical national infrastructure. Imaging technology used on military drones may also be used in border security, disaster response or search-and-rescue operations.
This growing dependence on specialist technologies is one reason why the UK-Israel defence relationship cannot easily be separated into simple categories of buyer and seller.
Elbit Systems and the British defence industry
No company illustrates this relationship better than Elbit Systems.
Much of Palestine Action’s campaign focused on Elbit, presenting it as an Israeli company manufacturing equipment for Israel. That description is only partly correct.
Elbit is an Israeli defence company, but it also operates significant businesses within the United Kingdom. Through British subsidiaries it employs hundreds of people, manufactures equipment in Britain and supplies products to the UK Ministry of Defence as well as overseas customers.
The British Army’s Watchkeeper drone programme, for example, is built around technology developed by Elbit and produced through a UK-based joint venture.
In other words, Elbit is not simply an overseas exporter selling into Britain. It is also part of Britain’s own defence industrial base.
That does not end the political argument over whether Britain should trade with Israeli defence companies. It does, however, explain why the issue is considerably more complicated than many headlines suggest.
A debate that has changed
The debate over British arms exports to Israel is often presented as though countries simply sell complete weapons to one another.
That might have been true 50 years ago. Modern defence industries operate through international supply chains in which software, sensors, specialist electronics and aircraft components move repeatedly between allied countries before becoming part of a finished system.
Britain’s direct exports to Israel are economically small. That much is true.
But those exports sit within a much broader network of multinational manufacturing, technology sharing and defence procurement. It is that network—not the value of the trade alone—that explains why successive governments have argued that ending every defence export to Israel is far more complicated than it first appears.
The distinction between what is military, what is civilian, and what is security services is much more blurred than it ever was. This reflects changes in technology and the changing nature of warfare. Military technology, in particular surveillance technology, is finding uses way beyond it’s original intention. The techniques that social media companies use to keep us clicking and liking and sharing are increasingly being used by Governments to keep us voting the way they want. The intersections of big tech, social media, and authoritarian politics are hard to miss.
Nowhere is this more apparent than Israel. Over Netanyahu’s period in office Israel has become increasingly militarised, and the distinction between civil society and the military is vanishing. Israel is becoming an authoritarian state in which the military and the security services don’t just occupy Gaza and the West Bank, they occupy Israeli life.
And they are selling those techniques to governments around the world.