Donald Trump and the Republican party just took a massive beating.
The Republicans went into the 2026 midterm elections with a number of advantages. They controlled the presidency, had billionaire backers and had spent years reshaping electoral boundaries and introducing voting restrictions. But on Tuesday, the Republicans suffered a sweeping defeat. The Democrats regained control of Congress, won elections in states that had seemed comfortably Republican and defeated candidates in constituencies that Trump had carried by substantial margins only two years earlier.
The scale of the result is remarkable enough. But there is another question that matters more for the long term. Why didn’t the Republicans’ attempts to manipulate the electoral system protect them from defeat? And, without those advantages, how much worse might the result have been?
Gerrymandering is hardly new to American politics. It takes its name from Elbridge Gerry, the governor of Massachusetts, who approved an extraordinary-looking electoral district in 1812. More than two centuries later, the practice remains a significant feature of American elections. The principle is straightforward. Rather than allowing voters to choose their representatives, politicians draw electoral boundaries to increase the chances of their own party winning. They can concentrate opposition voters into a small number of constituencies, where enormous majorities are effectively wasted, or spread their own supporters across a larger number of seats, creating enough modest majorities to win more representatives than their overall share of the vote might justify.
Both parties have engaged in partisan redistricting, although the scale and methods vary between states. Republicans use it a lot more than Democrats. In some states, independent commissions or courts constrain the process. In others, politicians retain considerable control over the boundaries on which their own political careers depend.
The American system also creates opportunities to make voting more difficult. Registration requirements, restrictions on voting methods, polling-place arrangements and voter identification rules can all affect participation. Some measures are defended as necessary for election security; critics argue that particular restrictions disproportionately burden certain groups. The effects need to be established rather than assumed.
Following Trump’s intervention, Republican-controlled states embarked on an unusual round of redistricting halfway between censuses. The objective was to protect the Republican majority in the House of Representatives and, where possible, increase it. Gerrymandering was the central Republican strategy to win in 2026. Texas was the most conspicuous example. Republicans redrew the state’s congressional map with the intention of gaining five additional seats. Similar efforts followed elsewhere, including Florida, Ohio and North Carolina.
And Republicans had an additional reason to feel confident. Trump had performed unexpectedly well among several groups in 2024, particularly Latino voters. By drawing districts around his presidential vote, they hoped to turn those gains into a lasting Republican advantage.
None of this worked. Democrats retained several constituencies that Republicans had redesigned to favour their candidates. They also captured Republican-held seats that had previously appeared secure.
There are at least four possible explanations, and I don’t think we should expect the same one to apply everywhere.
The first is that local activists, lawyers and community organisations successfully challenged electoral manipulation and helped voters overcome restrictions on participation.
The second is that demographic change, particularly in states such as Texas, has made Republican electoral advantages increasingly difficult to sustain. Historically gerrymandering has been racial – redrawing maps based on ethnicity based on the belief that minority voters were Democrats. But the US population has changed, not only is it more diverse but minorities are no longer confined to particular neighbourhoods.
The third is that Republicans designed their boundaries around Trump’s 2024 coalition without appreciating how quickly that coalition might fall apart. And the fourth is that, in trying to maximise the number of seats they could win, Republican mapmakers spread their supporters too thinly, leaving previously safe constituencies exposed when the political climate changed.
The results allow us to begin testing each explanation.
Did local activists defeat the Republican strategy?
There is a tendency to think of American elections as contests between presidential candidates and national political parties. But much of the practical work of democracy happens locally. Community organisations register voters, explain voting procedures, challenge restrictive rules and help people navigate a system that can be bewilderingly complicated. Lawyers challenge electoral boundaries, while local campaigns attempt to mobilise people who might otherwise stay at home.
These activities matter, but measuring their electoral effect is more difficult than demonstrating that they happened. In Texas, Democratic legislators attempted to obstruct the Republican redistricting programme by leaving the state and denying the legislature the quorum required to pass the new maps. They delayed the legislation, but ultimately failed to prevent the new boundaries being used.
That means the subsequent Democratic successes cannot simply be attributed to activists having overturned the Republican gerrymander. In several districts, Democrats won under the very boundaries designed to defeat them.
North Carolina offers a different test. Republicans had previously drawn congressional boundaries that gave them ten of the state’s fourteen seats. They then altered the map again in an attempt to improve their position, particularly by targeting Democratic congressman Don Davis. Davis survived, while Democrats made substantial gains in Republican-held districts elsewhere in the state.
There was also evidence of unusually high participation. An analysis by the Southern Coalition for Social Justice reported that early voting increased by approximately 36% compared with 2022, with Black early voting increasing by around 52%. Those figures suggest that voters were participating in substantially greater numbers. They do not, on their own, establish how much of that increase resulted from community organisation, opposition to Trump or other factors.
The same distinction applies to legal challenges. A successful court case can change electoral boundaries or protect access to voting. But the existence of litigation does not establish that it changed an election result. Alabama and Louisiana provide examples of the importance of voting-rights litigation and disputes over minority representation. The relationship between those proceedings, the maps eventually used and the results needs to be examined separately in each state.
There is evidence that local organisation and legal action played a role in the 2026 elections. What we cannot yet establish is how many seats would have changed hands without that work. It is an explanation worth taking seriously, but not one that can simply be read from the election results.
Has demographic change made gerrymandering impossible?
For years, Democrats have anticipated that demographic change would eventually transform states such as Texas. The argument was that a growing Latino population, combined with expanding metropolitan areas and younger voters, would steadily undermine the Republican majority.
There was a problem with this theory, which became particularly obvious in 2024. Latino voters are not a single political constituency, and their growing numbers do not automatically translate into more Democratic votes. Trump made substantial gains among Latino voters, particularly in South Texas. Counties that had traditionally voted Democratic supported him, sometimes by surprisingly comfortable margins.
Republicans concluded that the political geography of Texas had changed in their favour. That assumption became the foundation of their 2025 redistricting programme. Four of the five Democratic-held congressional districts targeted by the new map had majority-Hispanic eligible electorates. Republicans were not trying to minimise the number of Latino voters in these constituencies. In several cases, they were relying on those voters to deliver Republican victories.
The results exposed the danger of confusing demographic composition with political allegiance. Consider the 28th Congressional District, centred on Laredo. The redrawn constituency had a population that was approximately 91% Hispanic. Trump would have won it by around ten percentage points in 2024. Yet Democratic incumbent Henry Cuellar defeated Republican Tano Tijerina comfortably. The early figures showed Cuellar receiving approximately 103,000 votes against Tijerina’s 46,000, a Democratic two-party margin approaching 39 percentage points.
| Texas district | Trump margin, 2024 | Democrat, 2026 | Republican, 2026 | Democratic margin, 2026 | Change from 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 – Houston | R +20 | 68,866 | 42,241 | D +24.0 | 44.0 points |
| 15 – Rio Grande Valley | R +18 | 116,945 | 72,761 | D +23.3 | 41.3 points |
| 23 – West Texas | R +15 | 109,927 | 93,099 | D +8.3 | 23.3 points |
| 28 – Laredo | R +10 | 103,132 | 45,559 | D +38.7 | 48.7 points |
| 34 – Brownsville | R +10 | 112,465 | 80,128 | D +16.8 | 26.8 points |
| 35 – San Antonio | R +10 | 111,499 | 78,531 | D +17.3 | 27.3 points |
In the 34th District, covering Brownsville and other parts of South Texas, Vicente Gonzalez also retained his seat. The district had a large Hispanic population and would have voted for Trump by around ten points in 2024. Gonzalez nevertheless defeated Republican Eric Flores by a substantial margin.
The most dramatic example may be the 15th District. This was already a Republican seat, represented by Monica De La Cruz. Trump had carried the district by approximately 18 points in 2024. In 2026, De La Cruz lost to Bobby Pulido, a well-known Tejano musician. Early returns indicated a Democratic two-party lead of more than twenty points.
These results do not demonstrate that demographic change suddenly overwhelmed the Republican map. The population of South Texas did not change dramatically in two years. What changed was the way people voted, who turned out, or some combination of the two.
Demographic change remains important to understanding the longer-term political development of Texas. But it cannot explain these results without also considering changes in political behaviour. Indeed, the results undermine the simplistic assumption that demographic change inevitably benefits one party. In 2024, Republicans benefited from changes in Latino voting preferences. In 2026, the same constituencies became a source of difficulty for them.
That brings us to the third hypothesis.
Did Republicans design their gerrymander around the wrong electorate?
This is where the Texas results become particularly revealing. The Republican redistricting strategy relied heavily on Trump’s performance in 2024. The assumption was that constituencies he had carried by ten, fifteen or twenty points could be made reliably Republican. But a vote for Trump in a presidential election is not necessarily a vote for a Republican congressional candidate two years later.
People vote for different reasons in different elections. Some are attracted by individual candidates, others by particular issues. Turnout changes, economic conditions change, and voters who supported a president can become dissatisfied with his administration. The Texas results demonstrate how unreliable the 2024 presidential vote proved as a guide to the 2026 congressional election.
In the 28th District, Cuellar won despite the new boundaries favouring Trump by ten points in 2024. In the 34th, Gonzalez did the same.
The 35th District, around San Antonio, provides an additional test because it was not simply a case of a longstanding Democratic incumbent defending his seat. The boundaries were redrawn to create a constituency Trump would have carried by approximately ten points. Democrat Johnny Garcia nevertheless established a substantial lead over Republican Carlos De La Cruz in the early returns.
The 9th District, around Houston, also produced an apparent Democratic advantage despite being drawn to favour Republicans. The early figures suggested a particularly large change from Trump’s 2024 performance, although that result requires further verification before we rely on the precise margin. And in the 23rd District, Democrat Katy Padilla Stout challenged Republican Brandon Herrera in a constituency Trump had carried by approximately fifteen points.
Padilla Stout declared victory on election night. The contest also had unusual local circumstances: the previous Republican congressman, Tony Gonzales, had resigned following a scandal, while Herrera had attracted controversy over his public statements.
Those factors matter. We cannot attribute every Republican defeat to a national change in voting preferences. But the broader pattern is difficult to dismiss. Republicans repeatedly failed to convert Trump’s 2024 majorities into congressional victories.
Why?
Immigration enforcement is one possible explanation. Trump’s 2024 success among Latino voters partly reflected dissatisfaction with the economy and the Biden administration’s handling of immigration. But supporting tougher border controls is not necessarily the same thing as supporting every aspect of an aggressive deportation programme. By October 2026, polling by Pew Research Center showed that Trump’s approval among Latino registered voters had fallen substantially. Even among Latino voters who had supported him in 2024, approval had weakened. Some expressed concern that the administration was deporting too many undocumented immigrants.
It is not difficult to understand how an immigration policy that initially appealed to some voters might become less attractive when its consequences affected their own communities, friends or families.
But we should be careful not to make immigration do all the explanatory work. The same polling showed that economic concerns remained central to Latino voters. Inflation, the cost of living and dissatisfaction with government performance were important issues across the electorate.
The Republicans may therefore have made two related mistakes. They assumed that Trump’s 2024 Latino support represented a durable shift towards the Republican Party, and they assumed that the economic and political conditions that had produced that support would remain favourable. Neither assumption was secure.
The pattern was not confined to Texas. In Florida, Democrats including Kathy Castor, Pia Dandiya and Jared Moskowitz won in districts redrawn to improve Republican prospects.
In Ohio, established Democratic incumbents Greg Landsman and Marcy Kaptur survived Republican efforts to make their constituencies more competitive.
In Alabama, Democrat Shomari Figures retained the 2nd Congressional District despite boundaries that would have favoured Trump substantially in 2024.
These results suggest a wider problem with treating a presidential election as a reliable guide to subsequent congressional voting. The particular movement among Latino voters may help explain what happened in Texas, but the Republican difficulties extended well beyond Latino-majority constituencies.
The electoral coalition that delivered Trump’s victory in 2024 was not necessarily a permanent Republican coalition.
Did Republicans spread their support too thinly?
There is a mathematical problem at the heart of gerrymandering. A party can create a small number of constituencies with enormous majorities, but that wastes votes that might have helped it win elsewhere. Alternatively, it can distribute its supporters across more districts, creating a larger number of smaller majorities.
The second approach can produce more seats when political conditions are favourable. But it also creates a risk. If voters move against the party, a large number of apparently secure constituencies can become vulnerable simultaneously. This appears to have been an important feature of the 2026 election.
North Carolina provides one example. Republicans had constructed a congressional map designed to maximise their representation. The strategy gave them substantial advantages under the previous political conditions, but it also left a number of incumbents defending districts with less protection against a large electoral swing.
| District | Republican position before election | 2026 result |
|---|---|---|
| NC-1 | Redrawn to target Democrat Don Davis | Davis retained the seat |
| NC-3 | Greg Murphy defending | Murphy narrowly ahead |
| NC-5 | Virginia Foxx defending | Foxx trailing by 99 votes |
| NC-6 | Addison McDowell defending | Democrat Cyril Jefferson won |
| NC-9 | Richard Hudson defending | Democrat Richard Ojeda won |
| NC-11 | Republican-held open seat | Democrat Jamie Ager won |
| NC-13 | Brad Knott defending | Democrat Paul Barringer won |
| NC-14 | Tim Moore defending | Democrat Lakeshia Womack won |
Democrat Don Davis survived the attempt to redraw his 1st District against him. Elsewhere, Republicans faced unexpectedly difficult contests. Democrat Cyril Jefferson defeated Addison McDowell in the 6th District, while Richard Ojeda defeated Richard Hudson in the 9th. Democrats also gained seats involving Jamie Ager, Paul Barringer and Lakeshia Womack. Some of these contests involved local circumstances, including candidate controversies and open seats.
Nevertheless, the pattern raises an important question about the trade-off involved in the Republican map. In trying to win as many seats as possible, had Republicans reduced the majorities protecting their existing representatives?
Tennessee offers an even clearer illustration. Republicans redrew the state’s congressional boundaries to target a Democratic-held seat around Memphis. That part of the strategy succeeded. But changing one district inevitably affects others. Republican voters were redistributed, leaving the constituency represented by Scott DesJarlais substantially less Republican than before. DesJarlais, who had previously enjoyed comfortable majorities, found himself in an exceptionally close contest. Early reports placed him only a few hundred votes from his Democratic challenger.
The Republicans had strengthened their position in one constituency while weakening it in another. If the vulnerable seat ultimately changes hands, the intended gain elsewhere could be cancelled out. Even if DesJarlais survives, the result illustrates the danger of reducing the margins that protect incumbents.
Of course, we must also examine where the strategy worked. Tennessee’s Republican gain demonstrates that redistricting can still produce the intended result. In North Carolina, Greg Murphy remained competitive in a district that had absorbed additional Democratic voters as part of the wider boundary changes. Republicans also retained numerous constituencies despite the national movement towards Democrats.
That is important because a gerrymander can fail to deliver all its intended gains while still protecting a party from an even larger defeat. The same mechanism that can magnify a party’s advantage when it is popular can expose it when its support falls.
So why didn’t the gerrymander work?
The four hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and the evidence suggests that different mechanisms operated in different places.
| State | Republican redistricting objective | Evidence from 2026 | What it tells us |
|---|---|---|---|
| Texas | Gain five Democratic seats | Republicans appeared set to capture only one targeted seat | The 2024 Trump vote was an unreliable benchmark |
| Florida | Gain four seats | Democrats appeared to retain all four targeted seats | The problem extended beyond Latino-majority Texas districts |
| Ohio | Gain two seats | Greg Landsman and Marcy Kaptur survived | Established Democratic incumbents could overcome less favourable boundaries |
| Alabama | Gain one seat | Shomari Figures retained his district | The intended Republican advantage was insufficient |
| North Carolina | Gain another seat and protect existing Republican seats | Democrats flipped at least five Republican-held districts | Earlier gerrymandering left Republican incumbents exposed |
| Tennessee | Gain a Democratic seat | Republicans gained the targeted seat, but another Republican district became highly vulnerable | A clear example of the risks of spreading Republican votes |
| Louisiana | Gain one seat | The targeted district went to a December runoff | The outcome remains unresolved |
Local organisation and legal challenges may have helped sustain participation and protect voting rights, although their precise contribution to individual results remains difficult to quantify.
Demographic change altered the political geography of states such as Texas, but the rapid electoral changes between 2024 and 2026 cannot be explained by population growth alone.
Republicans repeatedly relied on Trump’s 2024 presidential vote as a guide to congressional elections, apparently underestimating how quickly the preferences and participation of those voters could change.
And in states such as North Carolina and Tennessee, the attempt to maximise Republican representation left some constituencies more vulnerable when the national political environment shifted.
The important point is that electoral engineering depends on assumptions about how people will vote. A carefully constructed constituency is only safe for as long as those assumptions remain reasonably accurate. The Republicans drew maps around the electorate that delivered Trump’s victory in 2024. Two years later, they faced a different electorate.
There is an irony here. Gerrymandering is intended to insulate politicians from changes in public opinion. But aggressive gerrymandering can make a party particularly vulnerable when those changes are larger than expected. That does not mean the practice has ceased to matter. Indeed, it may still have protected Republican representation in constituencies where the new boundaries preserved sufficient majorities.
Nor should we forget that Democrats have also used favourable redistricting to improve their own electoral prospects. The problem is not simply which party benefits. It is a political system that allows politicians to exercise such extensive influence over the boundaries within which voters choose their representatives.
The American electoral system remains unusually susceptible to this kind of manipulation, and the fact that it did not deliver the intended Republican gains in 2026 does not make it any more democratic.
And what happens when Trump is gone?
There is one final question, and it may prove more important than any of the others. The Democrats have assembled a coalition capable of defeating Republicans across a remarkably wide range of constituencies. It includes progressive urban voters, moderate suburban voters, sections of the working class and voters who supported Trump only two years earlier.
But how much do those voters actually agree about? Some oppose Trump’s immigration policies. Others are principally concerned about the cost of living. Some are motivated by concerns about democratic institutions and the concentration of presidential power. Others may simply have concluded that the administration has failed to deliver what they expected.
Opposition to Trump can unite people who disagree about almost everything else. That is an effective basis for an electoral coalition, but it does not automatically provide a coherent programme for government. The Democrats’ gains among Latino voters are particularly instructive. The evidence does not necessarily suggest that these voters have become committed Democrats. Some may simply have become disillusioned with the Republicans.
The same may be true of moderate voters who supported Democratic candidates in traditionally Republican constituencies. The Democrats therefore face a problem that is almost the mirror image of the one confronting Republicans. Republicans mistook Trump’s 2024 coalition for a permanent political realignment. Democrats should be cautious about making the same assumption about their own success in 2026.
The question is whether they can turn a coalition united by dissatisfaction with Trump into one united by a shared political programme.
For the moment, however, the lesson of the midterms is that even an electoral system carefully engineered to favour a political party cannot guarantee that voters will continue supporting it.
The Republicans tried to build their congressional majority around the electorate of 2024. The electorate of 2026 had other ideas.