The UK economy is doing OK. Not bad. Most likely it will be the 2nd fastest growing major economy this year after the US. Which is a big achievement give that the UK Government is cutting it’s budget deficit faster than any major economy while Trump runs a nearly 7% deficit.
But you wouldn’t guess that from newspapers and on-line.
There is something rather peculiar about the way the British economy is reported. When the economy performs badly, it is generally taken as confirmation of what we already knew. When it performs better than expected, it is a surprise. Growth is unexpected, employment is surprisingly resilient, investment defies forecasts and the Chancellor receives an unexpected boost. The good news is usually accompanied by a warning that it probably won’t last.
Of course, sometimes economic figures really are surprising. Economists make forecasts, the Office for National Statistics publishes the actual figures, and the two don’t always agree. That’s not remarkable. What interests me is how frequently the language of surprise appears in reporting positive economic developments, and what that tells us about the assumptions underlying economic journalism.
Over recent months I’ve been looking at the reporting of British economic performance across newspapers with very different political perspectives. The Guardian, Telegraph, Times, Financial Times, Mail, Mirror and Express don’t agree about very much, particularly when it comes to the current government. Yet their economic reporting often follows a remarkably similar pattern. Growth is unexpectedly strong, the figures provide a boost to the Chancellor, economists are surprised, and there is usually a paragraph explaining why we shouldn’t get too excited.
It is almost as though the British economy has a duty to disappoint us, and is behaving rather badly when it doesn’t.
Forecasts are not facts
First, there is an important distinction to make. Economic forecasts are not economic facts. They are estimates of what might happen, based on assumptions about how businesses, consumers, governments and financial markets will behave.
Those assumptions can be perfectly reasonable and still turn out to be wrong. They can also reflect prevailing economic orthodoxies, which may be less reliable than their advocates believe. But also humans are humans, they react to forecasts. Sometimes in good ways – the forecasts of economic doom if we voted leave led policy makers to prepare plans with deploy £10s of billions if we voted Leave. This saved the pound and the FTSE from collapse. Sometimes it works in negative ways – predictions of economic doom cause households to cut spending, which cuts growth.
There isn’t a single economic forecast against which we can judge the performance of the economy. The Office for Budget Responsibility, Bank of England, independent economists and commercial forecasters regularly disagree with one another. Some have been too pessimistic about growth; others have been too optimistic. It would be misleading to pretend that every forecast has underestimated the British economy.
The OBR, for example, forecast 2% growth for 2025 in its October 2024 outlook, substantially above the growth subsequently recorded. That is hardly evidence of an institution determined to underestimate economic performance. But that’s OK.
But that makes the way forecasts are reported even more interesting. A forecast is often presented as an authoritative description of the economic future. When the actual figures are published, any departure from the selected forecast becomes a surprise. We rarely stop to ask why that particular forecast was chosen, how much disagreement there was among economists, or whether the forecasters have a particularly good record.
The difference between a forecast and an outcome is an important piece of information. But it is not necessarily evidence that something extraordinary has happened.
The economy has proved rather more resilient than expected
The British economy has plenty of problems. Productivity growth has been weak for years, business investment has been disappointing, housing is expensive, public services are under pressure and living standards have been stretched since the Brexit vote. None of this is imaginary, and it would be absurd to suggest that a few positive GDP announcements mean everything is going swimmingly.
But there is another side to the story. Despite inflation, higher interest rates, political uncertainty, Brexit and a succession of shocks to the international economy, Britain has avoided some of the more dramatic economic outcomes repeatedly predicted for it.
Businesses have continued to employ people, consumers have continued to spend and investment has not simply disappeared. The economy has often been weak, but it has also shown a capacity to adjust that doesn’t always feature prominently in the forecasts.
Take the increase in employers’ National Insurance contributions announced in the October 2024 Budget. The response from much of the business community was predictably apocalyptic. Higher employment costs would lead to fewer jobs, lower wages, reduced investment and business closures. Some of those effects were entirely plausible, and there is evidence that higher employment costs have put pressure on recruitment and pay.
But the important question is not whether increasing employers’ National Insurance has a cost. Of course it does. The question is how large that cost is, how businesses respond to it, and whether the consequences are as dramatic as the initial predictions suggest.
This reminds me of the arguments surrounding the introduction of the National Minimum Wage. Employers and some economists warned that it would destroy jobs, particularly in low-paid sectors. Those concerns were not entirely irrational, but the catastrophic consequences failed to materialise. Businesses adjusted through a mixture of prices, productivity, profits and changes in employment practices.
That doesn’t mean every increase in employment costs is harmless. There will be a point at which higher costs do serious damage, and the effects will differ between sectors. But the economy is not a mechanical device in which an increase in one cost automatically produces an equivalent reduction in employment.
People and businesses adapt. Sometimes they adapt more successfully than economic models anticipate.
What if government spending actually encourages investment?
There is another assumption worth examining. Government spending and borrowing are frequently presented as competitors with private investment. The government borrows more, interest rates rise, private businesses find it harder to invest and the economy suffers. Economists call this crowding out.
There are circumstances in which that happens. If an economy is operating at full capacity, government borrowing can compete with private borrowers for scarce resources. Poorly targeted spending can also produce little lasting economic benefit.
But the opposite can happen too. Public investment in transport, energy infrastructure, research, education and technology can make private investment more attractive. A business may be much more willing to invest in a new factory if the electricity supply, transport connections and skilled workforce are already there.
This is crowding in, and it deserves rather more attention than it usually receives.
Consider the investment required for artificial intelligence, renewable energy, electricity networks and defence. These are not areas in which government and private investment operate in completely separate worlds. Public procurement, infrastructure, regulation and research funding can influence whether businesses invest at all.
A government that invests intelligently may create opportunities for private businesses rather than simply compete with them. This isn’t controversial, just look at the arguments over Palantir and the NHS.
I am not suggesting that every pound of public spending produces economic growth, or that governments have discovered a magical way to borrow without consequences. I remain sceptical of economic theories that promise painless solutions, whether they come from the left or the right. But the assumption that government activity necessarily suppresses private enterprise is no more convincing than the assumption that government spending always pays for itself.
Both propositions need to be tested against what actually happens.
When predictions become news
This brings me back to economic journalism.
There is an important difference between reporting that the economy grew by a particular amount and reporting that an economist believes the economy is heading for disaster. The first is a description of something that has happened, subject to the usual revisions and statistical uncertainties. The second is a prediction about something that may happen.
Both are legitimate subjects for journalism. The problem arises when they are presented with much the same authority.
A newspaper can publish an alarming prediction about economic collapse one day and a report of unexpectedly strong growth the next, without ever examining the relationship between the two. The prediction was news when it was made. The actual outcome is news when it arrives. But the question of whether the original prediction was sensible, and what we should learn from its failure, is rarely treated as news at all.
This is not simply a problem with newspapers that dislike the government. The Guardian can be just as enthusiastic about gloomy economic forecasts as the Telegraph, albeit for rather different political reasons. One newspaper sees evidence that the government is incompetent, another sees evidence that its policies are insufficiently ambitious, and a third sees another opportunity to explain why Britain is finished.
The underlying forecasts may be identical.
There is also a tendency to confuse business journalism with economic analysis. A business owner complaining about increased costs may have a perfectly legitimate grievance. But a collection of business owners complaining about increased costs does not, by itself, establish what will happen to the economy.
Businesses understand their own circumstances, but they are not necessarily reliable guides to the aggregate consequences of economic policy. A tax increase that reduces one company’s profits may finance spending that increases another company’s sales. A regulation that imposes costs on one sector may create opportunities elsewhere.
Understanding those effects requires more than collecting quotations from people who are unhappy.
Where does the story actually come from?
I became curious about the remarkable similarities in the reporting of recent economic announcements, so I compared some newspaper coverage with the corresponding Reuters reports.
The similarities were striking. The same growth figures, the same references to economists being surprised, the same suggestions that the Chancellor had received a welcome boost and the same warnings that the outlook remained difficult appeared repeatedly.
But the comparison also complicated my original suspicion.
Much of this framing was already present in Reuters’ reporting. And some newspaper articles contained additional quotations, different emphases and evidence of independent work. In one case, the Guardian’s report appeared at almost exactly the same time as the Reuters version. That is hardly compelling evidence that somebody simply copied the agency story.
There is also a perfectly innocent explanation for some of the similarity. Journalists are reporting the same statistical announcement, often at seven o’clock in the morning, against the same published forecasts. It would be surprising if they didn’t report many of the same facts.
Nevertheless, the exercise raised an interesting question. How much of what appears to be a wide range of independent economic commentary is actually derived from a relatively small number of original sources?
Reuters and other news agencies have always supplied newspapers with information. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. But economic journalism should do more than transmit statistical releases, reproduce forecasts and collect reactions from the usual economists and business organisations.
It should examine the assumptions behind those forecasts, compare them with previous predictions and ask whether the evidence supports the conclusions being offered.
If every newspaper reports that economists have been surprised, surely somebody ought to ask why they keep being surprised.
More content, fewer journalists
Part of the explanation lies in the changing economics of journalism itself.
Newspapers have spent much of the past two decades struggling to replace the advertising revenue they lost as readers moved online. Digital advertising rewards page views, and publishers have become increasingly dependent on search engines, social media platforms and the unpredictable decisions of the companies that control them.
Meanwhile, newsrooms have been reduced, specialist reporters have disappeared and journalists are expected to produce more material for more platforms.
In October 2024, Press Gazette reported on internal discussions at Reach, the publisher of the Mirror, Express and numerous regional newspapers. Journalists at Birmingham Live had initially been told to produce at least eight stories per shift when they were not out gathering news. Following objections, the expectations were revised, but the underlying commercial pressure remained.
Reach’s editorial director explained that traffic from Facebook had fallen dramatically and that producing more articles was one of the few variables the company could directly control.
It is difficult to imagine a better illustration of the problem. Good economic journalism takes time. It requires understanding the statistics, questioning the assumptions, speaking to people with different perspectives and remembering what was predicted six months ago.
Rewriting a press release or producing another version of a story that is already circulating is much quicker. The commercial incentives increasingly favour the second activity. And the consequences extend beyond economics. Local newspapers, once staffed by reporters who understood their communities and institutions, are particularly vulnerable to becoming collections of rapidly produced stories assembled from press releases, official statements and material published elsewhere.
That is not because journalists have suddenly become less capable. It is because the organisations employing them increasingly demand a different kind of work.
And then there is artificial intelligence
I wrote last year about the growing use of artificial intelligence in journalism, and my concern that newspapers were producing more material with fewer journalists while increasingly relying on recycled information and automated production.
Since then, the technology has continued to develop, and publishers have become more open about its use.
Reach provides an interesting example. In its 2024 reporting, the company described AI tools capable of doubling the speed at which stories could be uploaded. It also reported that journalists using AI tools had supported content generating 1.8 billion page views during the year.
That doesn’t mean AI wrote 1.8 billion page views’ worth of journalism, or that every story produced using those tools was simply copied from somewhere else. But it does demonstrate the scale at which AI has become part of the production process.
There are perfectly legitimate uses for this technology. AI can help journalists analyse data, transcribe interviews, search documents and carry out routine tasks. Used intelligently, it could free journalists to spend more time investigating stories and less time doing administrative work.
But it can also make it much easier to produce another version of an existing article, another summary of a press release or another piece of commentary built around assumptions that nobody has independently examined.
Which brings me back to those remarkably similar economic headlines.
I found no convincing evidence that the newspaper articles I examined had been rewritten using AI. It would be wrong to claim otherwise. The similarities may be explained by common sources, established journalistic conventions and the pressure to publish quickly.
But when newspapers are expected to produce ever more content, when fewer specialist journalists are available to scrutinise it, and when AI makes reproducing existing material faster and cheaper than ever before, the question seems worth asking.
Are we seeing genuinely independent assessments of the British economy, or increasingly different versions of the same assessments, produced by organisations that have less time and fewer resources to question them?
The British economy will undoubtedly continue to produce disappointing figures, occasional pleasant surprises and forecasts that turn out to be wrong. That is what economies do.
What journalism ought to do is help us understand why.
Instead, we seem to have developed a system in which economists are regularly surprised by what happens, newspapers are surprised that economists are surprised, and nobody is particularly interested in discovering why.
Perhaps the next unexpected development will be an economic journalist asking whether the forecasts were any good in the first place.